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Labor Law-Constitutional Law: First Amendment
Rights Infringed by Employer Proviso of Section
101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act
Several unions brought an action to restrain the National Right
to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation (Foundation) from
funding suits by union members against their labor organizations.,
Their cause of action was premised on a proviso to section 101(a)(4)
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-
Griffin) Act,' which prohibits any "interested employer or employer
association" from financing lawsuits by union members against their
unions.' In order to obtain evidence that the Foundation was an asso-
ciation of "interested employers," plaintiffs sought through inter-
1. The original complaint, filed by ten unions, sought declaratory and injunctive
relief and damages against the National Right to Work Committee and the National
Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation. It alleged that the defendants
had financed 23 lawsuits by union members and dues-paying nonmembers against
their labor organizations. See UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ.
Foundation, 433 F. Supp. 474, 479-80 (D.D.C. 1977), appeal docketed, Nos. 77-1739,
77-1766, 77-1767 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16 & 23, 1977); UAW v. National Right to Work Legal
Defense & Educ. Foundation, 366 F. Supp. 46, 47 (D.D.C. 1973). A number of suits
financed by the Foundation have resulted in reported opinions. See, e.g., McNamara
v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975) (action by members of local union against
union officers who had used union funds to aid political candidates), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 911 (1976); Gabauer v. Woodcock, 520 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1975) (action by former
union officers who claimed their removal from office for opposing a strike and distribut-
ing handbills in violation of a union censorship order was an infringement of their
rights of speech and due process); Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio
Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.) (action by a television commentator claiming that the
requirement that he join a union and pay dues before he could appear on television
was an infringement of his first amendment rights), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974);
Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1971)(action by nonunion
members against union challenging the spending of dues collected from the plaintiffs
under an agency shop agreement for political purposes).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1970).
3. Id. In an earlier opinion arising from the same case, the court had held that
the proviso gave the unions standing to sue to protect themselves against infringement
of their statutory right to be free from union member lawsuits funded by employers.
See UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, 366 F. Supp.
46 (D.D.C. 1973). The court concluded that, under the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4)
(1970), a union faced with such lawsuits had two options. First, it could interpose the
alleged illegal funding activities of the employer or employer association as a defense
in the action. Second, the union could seek equitable relief in order to restrain the
employer or employer organization from funding suits by union members. See 366 F.
Supp. at 49.
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rogatories to discover the identity of the Foundation's contributors.'
The defendant refused to disclose this information,5 despite a court
order to do so.' Because of this refusal, the court invoked the sanc-
tions authorized by Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure7 and deemed established the allegation that the defendant was
an" 'interested employer association' which acts as a conduit to per-
mit 'interested employers' to fund union members in litigation
against their labor organizations." '8 Plaintiffs thereupon moved
for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction. Defendant
counterclaimed for declaratory relief, arguing that, regardless of the
identity of its contributors, the application of section 101(a) (4) to the
4. The plaintiffs initially sought to discover the identity of all businesses that
had contributed to the Foundation in 1972. When the Foundation refused to answer
these interrogatories, the plaintiffs narrowed their request and filed a motion to compel
disclosure. The revised request sought the amounts contributed to the Foundation by
the 116 persons listed on its business advisory committee, the names of the 37 compa-
nies who gave more than $500 in 1972, and the names of 37 companies drawn at random
from those contributing between $100 and $500 in 1972. See National Right to Work
Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation v. Richey, 510 F.2d 1239, 1241 n.4 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975).
5. The Foundation argued that its contributors' names were protected from dis-
closure under NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In Patterson
the Supreme Court held that the first amendment rights of association and privacy
protected the NAACP's membership lists from disclosure required by state law. The
Foundation apparently argued that its contributors, like those of the NAACP, would
be subject to reprisals if the membership lists were made public. See National Right
to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation v. Richey, 510 F.2d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975); Brief for Appellees at 50-51, UAW v. National Right
to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, Nos. 77-1739, 77-1766, 77-1767 (D.C. Cir.,
filed Aug. 16 & 23, 1977).
6. When the Foundation was ordered to disclose the names of its contributors,
see UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, 376 F. Supp.
1060 (D.D.C. 1974), it unsuccessfully sought to have the order reviewed via a petition
of mandamus. The Court of Appeals did not rule on the merits of the argument that
compulsory disclosure was unconstitutional, see generally note 5 supra, holding instead
that mandamus was not appropriate since disclosure would not deny adequate appel-
late review of the discovery order at a later time. See National Right to Work Legal
Defense & Educ. Foundation v. Richey, 510 F.2d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1008 (1975).
7. If a party .. . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,
...the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard
to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or
any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes
of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
8. UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, 433 F.
Supp. 474, 480 (D.D.C. 1977), appeal docketed, Nos. 77-1739, 77-1766, 77-1767 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 16 & 23, 1977).
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defendant infringed its first amendment rights. The court granted
summary judgment for the defendant on the constitutional question,
holding that section 101(a)(4) of the Act "clearly, directly, and
absolutely interferes with the first amendment rights of petition, as-
sociation, and speech of the Foundation and its contributors."9 UA W
v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Education Foundation,
433 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D.D.C. 1977), appeal docketed, Nos. 77-1739,
77-1766, 77-1767 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16 & 23, 1977).
The Landrum-Griffm Act was enacted in 1959 with the goal of
expanding the basic rights of union members in their dealings with
labor organizations without severely weakening the unions by strip-
ping them of their disciplinary powers." In keeping with this purpose,
title I of the Act consists 6f a "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor
Organizations."" Section 101(a)(4) of title I provides union members
9. The court also held that the plaintiff unions did not have a private cause of
action to enforce the reporting requirements of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, § 203(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 433(b)(1) (1970).
See 433 F. Supp. at 484. Section 203(b) requires all persons entering into certain types
of agreements with employers to file an annual report with the Secretary of Labor. The
Act states that such a report must be filed by
[e]very person who pursuant to any agreement or arrangement with an
employer undertakes activities where an object thereof is, directly or indi-
rectly-
(1) to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or per-
suade employees as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing; or
(2) to supply an employer with information concerning the
activities of employees or a labor organization in connection with a
labor dispute involving such employer, except information for use
solely in conjunction with an administrative or arbitral proceeding or
a criminal or civil judicial proceeding ....
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,
§ 203(b)(1)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 433(b)(1)-(2) (1970). The court held that this disclosure
requirement could be enforced only in a civil action brought by the Secretary of Labor.
See UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, 433 F. Supp.
474, 483-84 (D.D.C. 1977), appeal docketed, Nos. 77-1739, 77-1766, 77-1767 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 16 & 23, 1977).
10. See Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights"for Union Members,
45 MINN. L. Rxv. 199, 201 (1960).
11. Rights protected by section 101(a) of title I include (1) the right to nominate
candidates and vote in union elections and referendums, see Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(1) (1970); (2) the right to assemble with other members and express views on
union candidates and policies, see id. § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2); (3) the right
to be free from dues increases unless such increases are effected by prescribed demo-
cratic procedures, see id. § 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3); (4) the right to appear as
a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, to petition any
legislature, and to communicate with any legislator, see id. § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 411 (a)(4); and (5) the right to certain procedural protections before a union member
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with the right to sue their union or its officials, subject only to two
qualifications: union members must exhaust intraunion hearing pro-
cedures before bringing a suit,12 and such suits may not be instigated
or funded by an "interested employer."
The employer proviso of section 101(a) (4) broadly states that "no
interested employer or employer association shall directly or indi-
rectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any
. . . action, proceeding, appearance, or petition" brought by a union
member against his union.13 The legislative history of the proviso
can be expelled, suspended, or otherwise disciplined, see id. § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(5).
12. Section 101(a)(4) provides,
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative
agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers
are named as defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding... :
Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable
hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within
such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings
against such organizations or any officer thereof ....
Id. § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4).
13. Id. Since 1959 only five reported opinions have discussed the meaning and
scope of the employer proviso. Two of these involved the same parties in earlier phases
of the litigation leading to the opinion in UAW v. National Right to Work Legal
Defense & Educ. Foundation, 433 F. Supp. 474 (D.D.C. 1977), appeal docketed, Nos.
77-1739, 77-1766, 77-1767 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16 & 23, 1977). The first, UAW v. National
Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, 366 F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1973), held
that the proviso gave unions standing to sue in order to enforce its terms. See note 3
supra. The other opinion, UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ.
Foundation, 376 F. Supp. 1060 (D.D.C. 1974), held that the scope of the proviso was
not limited to union member suits based on a violation of rights guaranteed by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, § 101
(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)-(b) (1970), but extended to any suit brought by a union
member against his union. See 376 F. Supp. at 1064. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, has held that the proviso does not apply when an employer finances
the defense or counterclaim of a union member being sued by his union. See Interna-
tional Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 336 v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 496 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974). Illinois Bell involved a suit by a union to
prevent an employer from financing the defense of union members in a state court
action for the enforcement of union fines. See id. at 2.
Two other opinions have dealt with constructions of the proviso's term "interested
employer." In Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), a federal district court concluded that the term must be narrowly construed in
order to effectuate the statute's policy in protecting the union member's right to sue.
In Farowitz a musician's lawsuit seeking an injunction requiring his union to reinstate
him was funded by employers hiring musicians on a single engagement basis. The court
held that the suit was not barred by the proviso since the only benefits derived by the
employer were "satisfaction" and "incidental propaganda value." Id. at 898-901, 908.
In Adamszewski v. Local Lodge 14787, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 496 F.2d 777 (7th Cir.
1974), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the term included any employer
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reveals that this language was intended to ensure that interested
employers could not take advantage of rights accorded union mem-
bers "by encouraging or financing harassing suits or proceedings
brought by union members against their unions.""
In holding the employer proviso unconstitutional," the UAW
court engaged in a two-step analysis familiar in first amendment
cases.' 6 It first considered whether employer funding of lawsuits
with a "concrete" business interest in the union member's suit. Adamszewski involved
an action brought by employees against the union and its officers to enjoin disciplinary
proceedings against plaintiffs for crossing picket lines of a sister union. The employer
was barred from funding the suit on the ground that his collective bargaining position
would be improved by a favorable disposition of the case. See id. at 779-80, 784.
14. Rothman, supra note 10, at 215 (quoting Rep. Griffin).
15. Prior to UAWone commentator had suggested that the proviso might conflict
with the first amendment by hindering an employer's lobbying efforts:
Suppose an employer association which favors a state "right-to-work" law
appeals, through the medium of paid newspaper advertisements, for support
of the proposed law by all working men and women. Suppose, further, that
the advertisement contains a petition urging adoption of the proposed law,
addressed to the state legislature, which the readers are urged to cut out and
mail. Suppose, finally, that the association solicits funds to support the
campaign for the new law and offers to contribute one dollar to the fund for
every ten dollars received from persons who identify themselves as union
employees. Such conduct would seem to be outlawed by the proviso; if it is,
the proviso may violate the first amendment.
Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (pt. 1), 73 HARV.
L. REv. 851, 871-72 (1960).
No commentator or court, however, had ever suggested that Congress could not
constitutionally prevent employers or employer associations from funding union mem-
ber lawsuits against their labor organizations. See, e.g., Hickey, The Bill of Rights of
Union Members, 48 GEo. L.J. 226 (1959); Peterson, Landrum-Griffin: An Analysis, 11
LAB. L.J. 703 (1960); Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 46 VA. L. REv. 195 (1960).
The Court of Appeals considering the Foundation's petition for mandamus appar-
ently found the argument that Congress could not constitutionally bar employer fund-
ing of union member suits against their labor organizations so novel that it could not
believe that the Foundation was actually making it:
The Foundation's argument on this question appears to rest on their
assertion that they are a neutral group, not a front for "interested" employ-
ers, and that therefore they come within the protections afforded by
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415. . . (1963) ....
We do not understand petitioners to argue that Congress may not pro-
hibit direct financing by an interested employer through a sham or cover
entity. Their argument rather must rest on their assertion that they are a
neutral body, and the constitutional question they present thus cannot be
decided without a determination of what type of organization the Founda-
tion is in fact.
National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation v. Richey, 510 F.2d 1239,
1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975).
16. Under this test, the court first considers whether the statute being challenged
interferes with a constitutionally protected right. It then determines whether there is
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brought by union members against their labor organizations was enti-
tled to any constitutional protection. The court noted that the first
amendment right to petition'7 has been held to encompass the right
of access to the courts," and reasoned that this right to litigate de-
serves particular protection when exercised by an association formed
for the purpose of advancing political beliefs: "[Tihe first amend-
ment has traditionally been construed strictly in cases involving po-
litical expression .... '[D]ecisions [of the Supreme Court] estab-
lish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to
associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected
by the First [Amendment].' " Because of the nexus between the
right of access to the courts and the right to associate for the purpose
of advancing political views, the court concluded that the employer
proviso interfered directly with the Foundation's first amendment
rights. 0
The court then considered whether the governmental interests
served by the proviso were sufficiently compelling to justify this inter-
ference,2' accepting the union's contention that the statute was in-
tended to prevent employers from interfering with intraunion rela-
tions and from abusing the rights guaranteed to union members by
section 101(a)(4) .21 Although the court claimed to have given "careful
consideration" to these interests, it concluded without discussion
that they could not justify the proviso's broad interference with the
Foundation's first amendment rights.2 3 The court apparently felt that
a governmental interest sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement. A further
inquiry is often made to determine whether the statute is the least burdensome means
of achieving the governmental objective. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
17. "It is well-established that 'the rights to assemble peaceably and to petition
for a redress of grievances are among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded
by the Bill of Rights.'" 433 F. Supp. at 482 (quoting UMW, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)).
18. "It is also well-established that 'the right to petition extends to all depart-
ments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of
the right to petition.'" Id. (quoting California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlim-
ited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)).
19. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 233 (1977)).
20. See id.
21. The court first cited Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977), for the
proposition that a first amendment infringement may be constitutional if justified by
a "compelling state interest." It then noted, however, that "'[i]n view of the funda-
mental nature' of the first amendment rights infringed upon by the proviso, the Court
must subject the proviso ' "to the closest scrutiny."' " 433 F. Supp. at 482 (brackets
in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (quoting NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958))).
22. See 433 F. Supp. at 483; text accompanying notes 52-55 infra.
23. See 433 F. Supp. at 483.
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the broad scope of the statute made an extended analysis of the
governmental interests unnecessary:
Even if the governmental interests served by the proviso were suffi-
ciently compelling to justify some abridgement of first amendment
rights, it is manifestly clear that the "unlimited and indiscriminate
sweep of the statute" and its "comprehensive interference" with the
first amendment rights of the Foundation and its contributors "goes
far beyond what might be justified. .. "
The proviso . . . is certainly not narrowly drawn to minimize
the infringement on first amendment rights; nor do the benefits
gained by operation of the proviso "outweigh the loss of constitu-
tionally protected rights."21
The UA W court's use of two seemingly inconsistent legal ana-
lyses leaves the scope of its holding in doubt. The court's characteri-
zation of the Foundation's activities as a form of "political associa-
tion'" and its repeated observation that the proviso was unconstitu-
tional "as applied to the Foundation"2 suggest that it may have
intended to deal only with the constitutionality of enforcing the stat-
ute under the particular circumstances of the case, leaving unre-
solved the broader question whether the proviso would be constitu-
tional in other contexts." On the other hand, the court's emphasis on
the proviso's "unlimited and indiscriminate sweep"" and its observa-
tion that Congress might cure the constitutional infirmities of the
proviso by narrowing its scope 9 suggest that the court considered the
statute overbroad on its face." The case could thus be read as holding
the proviso void in its entirety and unenforceable as currently writ-
ten.
Considering the novelty and complexity of the question, the
court's treatment of the constitutional issue is surprisingly brief and
conclusory. While the opinion quotes broad language from several
24. Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,490 (1960), and Elrod v. Bums,
427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976)).
25. Id. at 482.
26. Id. at 481, 483.
27. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv.
L. REv. 844, 844 (1970)("Judicial decisionmaking under the 'as applied' method of
review allows the law to operate where it might do so constitutionally and vindicates
a claimant who shows that his own conduct is within the first amendment and cannot
be burdened in the manner attempted.").
28. 433 F. Supp. at 483.
29. See id.
30. See generally Note, supra note 27, at 845 ("The newer and more aggressive
method of reviewing overbroad laws on their face involves scrutiny to determine
whether a statute is too sweeping in coverage-and if so, invalid on its face. Such
review proceeds without regard to the constitutional status of a particular complain-
ant's conduct.") (footnote omitted).
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cases for the proposition that the rights of association and access to
the courts are protected by the first amendment,31 the only case cited
that dealt directly with the issue of whether an organization has a
constitutional right to encourage and fund litigation was NAACP v.
Button.2 In Button, the Supreme Court held that the first amend-
ment granted the NAACP the right to encourage and finance lawsuits
on behalf of blacks who were being denied their constitutional
rights." The holding in Button was relatively narrow, recognizing a
first amendment right to aid another party's lawsuit only where such
efforts were "a form of political expression." In dictum, the Court
in Button distinguished litigation for political purposes from litiga-
tion designed to "resolve private differences" or secure purely private
gain. 5 Although the only facts given in the UAW opinion support the
conclusion that the Foundation was funding suits for the "purely
private gain" of its contributors, in equating the position of the Foun-
dation with that of the NAACP in Button," the UA W court neverthe-
less apparently found that the suits funded by the Foundation were
for political purposes.37 The opinion's express reliance on the narrow
31. See notes 17-18 supra; text accompanying note 19 supra.
32. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
33. We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal
staff... are modes of expression and association protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power
to regulate the legal profession, as improper solicitation of legal business
violative of [the state statute barring solicitation of legal business] and the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
Id. at 428-29. Among other activities, the NAACP was paying all the expenses in
certain lawsuits alleging racial discrimination. See id. at 420.
34. Id. at 429.
35. Id. at 429, 443.
36. "This Court finds that, for the Foundation, as the Supreme Court found for
the NAACP in the seminal case of NAACP v. Button . . . , 'association for litiga-
tion may be the most effective form of political association.'" 433 F. Supp. at 482.
37. The Foundation argued that it was an independent legal aid organization
that assisted employees seeking to redress infringements on rights resulting from com-
pulsory unionism. Although the Foundation admitted receiving contributions from
employers, it maintained that the Foundation was neither influenced nor controlled
by its contributors. See Brief for Appellees at 9, 21, UAW v. National Right to Work
Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, Nos. 77-1739, 77-1766, 77-1767 (D.C. Cir., filed
Aug. 16 & 23, 1977).
The court apparently accepted the Foundation's allegations. The Foundation's
contention that it was neither influenced nor controlled by its employer contributors
seems, however, totally inconsistent with the facts, deemed established under Rule 37
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that
the Foundation [had] been acting as an agent and conduit for employers
interested in promoting . . . suits in order to (1) promote their self-interest
in restricting the permissible scope of legality of union security provisions to
which they have agreed, been asked to agree, or expect to be required to
agree; (2) weaken the dues resources of labor organizations with which they
[Vol. 62:715
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holding of Button, therefore, suggests that the court might well have
found the proviso constitutional if it had been drafted to exclude
associations of employers that use litigation to further political goals.
This reading presents difficulties. The court's categorization of
the Foundation as a political group creates a serious question as to
whether the political-economic distinction has any vitality. Thus it
may be that any group, regardless of its purpose, will be categorized
as political simply because it is an association. Moreover, the court's
apparent emphasis on the associational character of the Foundation38
leaves in doubt the applicability of its holding to individual employ-
ers who attempt to fund suits by their own employees against the
union with which they must bargain. The employer proviso certainly
would not infringe upon the associational right of an unassociated
employer, and the immediacy of the economic interests of an em-
ployer bargaining with a particular union would arguably undermine
his claims to political and ideological goals."
On the other hand, an individual employer could claim that his
right to fund union member lawsuits falls directly within the scope
of the UA W holding. First, the language in UA W stressing the right
of association is arguably superfluous since it seems logically anoma-
lous to forbid the employer to pursue directly goals that he is allowed
to pursue through a "conduit.""0 Second, the requirement that the
funded litigation must be a means of expressing political views in-
stead of merely pursuing private gain could be satisfied by the em-
ployer's claim that his reasons for financing union members' lawsuits
are political as well as economic. This may often be a persuasive
argument since an employer's immediate economic concerns are
likely to coincide with such political views as general opposition to
have or anticipate having collective bargaining relationships; and (3) gener-
ally establish legal limitations on union security and union political activi-
ties which enhance union strength vis-a-vis such employers.
433 F. Supp. at 481. Despite these facts, the court concluded that the Foundation was
a fundamentally political group within the ambit of Button.
38. See 433 F. Supp. at 482; note 36 supra.
39. It is doubtful, for instance, that an individual employer could credibly claim
to be pursuing goals analogous to those claimed by the Foundation: "a) To establish
legal precedents protecting every American worker against every abuse of his or her
civil rights growing out of compulsory unionism; b) To provide legal aid for insuring
that such rights established by law and legal interpretation are, in fact, attainable by
each American employee." National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation Pam-
phlet (untitled) (n.d.) [hereinafter cited as Foundation Pamphlet] (on file at
MINNEsOTA LAw Ravmw).
40. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958), the Su-
preme Court noted that "[the NAACP] and its members are in every practical sense
identical. The Association ... is but the medium through which its individual mem-
bers seek to make more effective the expression of their own views."
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compulsory unionism. Because an employer's purpose in funding a
lawsuit is subjective, it would be difficult for a union to rebut an
employer's testimony concerning his political motivation. Finally,
requiring the employer to prove a political motivation may encourage
him to fund suits against unions in order to be able to demonstrate a
pattern of opposition to unionism generally. If individual employers
can avoid whatever continuing validity the UA W court intended the
employer proviso to have merely by claiming that the lawsuits they
are financing are politically motivated, then, for all practical pur-
poses, the approach adopted by the UA W court not only will have
deprived the employer proviso of any constitutionally permissible
application, but may in fact encourage employer funding of suits
against unions.
These difficulties arise because the court's rationale is inappro-
priate both in terms of the facts of the case and in terms of the larger
context in which employers seek to fund suits by employees against
their union. Distinctions between political and economic speech and
between associated and individual employers are simply untenable in
the context of a labor dispute. The court should have forgone these
distinctions and held outright that all employer funding of litigation
by union members is protected by the first amendment. This ap-
proach seems preferable for several reasons. First, it would not re-
quire the dubious distinction between the constitutional rights of an
association and those of its members. Second, it would avoid the
seemingly unmanageable judicial chore of determining whether the
motivations of a particular employer or association are primarily eco-
nomic or political. Most important, this view seems more consistent
with the traditional protections accorded commercial speech in the
labor context.
Under the "commercial speech doctrine," first articulated in
Valentine v. Chrestensen,4 the regulation of commercial speech does
not necessarily violate the first amendment. More recently, however,
the United States Supreme Court, in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.2 and Bates v.
41. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The Valentine Court held that the first amendment
imposes no restraint on government regulation of "purely commercial advertising."
Id. at 54. See generally Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78
HARv. L. REv. 1191, 1192-94 (1965).
42. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Virginia State Board concerned the question whether
local governments could constitutionally prohibit pharmacists from advertising the
prices of prescription drugs. See id. at 749-50. In an earlier opinion, Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Supreme Court had struck down a state law prohibiting the
circulation of any publication encouraging or promoting the procuring of an abortion.
The defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor for printing an advertisement in
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State Bar,4" has narrowed the commercial speech doctrine by holding
that certain types of commercial advertising are constitutionally pro-
tected. At the same time, the Court reaffirmed that the first amend-
ment also protects the speech of parties to a labor dispute, notwith-
standing the economic nature of such expression:
The interests of the contestants in a labor dispute are primarily
economic, but it has long been settled that both the employee and
the employer are protected by the First Amendment when they
express themselves on the merits of the dispute in order to influence
its outcome. . . . We know of no requirement that, in order to avail
themselves of First Amendment protection, the parties to a labor
dispute need address themselves to the merits of unionism in general
or to any subject beyond their immediate dispute.
T he constitutionality of restrictions upon speech in the
special context of labor disputes is not before us here. We express
no views on that complex subject, and advert to cases in the labor
field only to note that in some circumstances speech of an entirely
private and economic character enjoys the protection of the First
Amendment."
his newspaper that announced that abortions were legal in New York and that offered
the services of a referral agency in that state. See id. at 811-12.
43. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates involved the question whether certain attorney
advertising is protected by the first amendment. See id. at 356.
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978), the Supreme Court
refused to extend the holding in Bates to cover a lawyer's solicitation of clients with
personal injury claims. The Court distinguished "truthful advertising about the availa-
bility and terms of routine legal services," id. at 1918, from the "solicitation of business
by a lawyer through direct, in-person communication with the prospective client," id.
at 1917, and held that the first amendment did not prevent a bar association acting
with state authorization from disciplining a lawyer who solicited clients for pecuniary
gain, id. at 1920. In a companion case, however, the Court held that a state could not
discipline an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) lawyer for informing a woman
who had been sterilized as a condition of receiving public medical assistance that the
ACLU would provide free legal assistance for a suit against the doctor who performed
the operation. See In re Primus, 98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978). Relying on NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court in Primus stated that the solicitation of prospective
clients by a nonprofit organization, which engages in litigation as a form of political
association and expression, is conduct protected by the first amendment. See id. at
1902-05.
The UA W court did not specifically address the question of whether the Founda-
tion's activities constituted a solicitation of prospective union member litigants. Argu-
ably, the Foundation did not engage in the actual solicitation of litigants, but only the
funding of litigation, see 433 F. Supp. at 482, and the advertising of such funding, see
Foundation Pamphlet, supra note 39. Even if the Foundation is found to have solicited
litigants, however, its activities would appear to be closer to the facts of Primus than
to those of Ohralik. The Foundation's interest in supporting union members in suits
against their union should predominate over the remote, indirect possibility of pecu-
niary gain to the Foundation's member employers.
44. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762-63 & n.17 (1976).
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In Bates, the Court again recognized that speech does not auto-
matically lose its first amendment protection simply because "the
speaker's interest is largely economic,"45 citing NLRB v. Gissel Pack-
ing Co.4 and Thornhill v. Alabama,47 two leading cases dealing with
commercial speech in the labor context.
In Gissel, the Court had noted that "an employer's free speech
right to communicate his views to his employees is firmly established
and cannot be infringed by a union. 48 In the earlier case of Thorn-
hill v. Alabama,49 the Supreme Court had suggested reasons for pro-
tecting the self-interested speech of labor disputants:
[Tihe practices in a single factory may have economic repercus-
sions upon a whole region and affect widespread systems of market-
ing. The merest glance at state and federal legislation on the subject
demonstrates the force of the argument that labor relations are not
matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning
the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears
to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the pro-
cesses of popular government to shape the destiny of modem in-
dustrial society.4
The protection traditionally extended to commercial speech in the
labor context thus appears to arise from the inherent difficulty in
labeling such speech either political or economic. This aspect of the
commercial speech doctrine seems particularly relevant to the ques-
tion presented by UA W, since the distinction between political and
economic motivation is similarly unworkable in the context of an
employer-funded lawsuit.
Although funding lawsuits is arguably distinguishable from
merely expressing one's views on the merits of a labor dispute,
NAACP v. Button5' established that litigation is a form of expression
protected by the first amendment. Button held that a lawsuit was
constitutionally protected only when it was "a form of political ex-
pression," but the holding was based on the broader logic that a party
cannot be prevented from encouraging or financing a lawsuit when
that activity is a form of expression protected by the first amend-
ment. Since the speech of labor disputants enjoys this protection even
though it is a form of self-interested commercial speech, the encour-
agement and financing of a union member's lawsuit by the employer
would also appear to be protected. Under this view, the employer
45. 433 U.S. at 364.
46. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
47. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
48. 395 U.S. at 617.
49. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
50. Id. at 103.
51. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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proviso represents a potential infringement on the first amendment
rights of all employers, not just those who contribute to associations
that fund union member lawsuits with broader political objectives in
mind.
The fact that the employer proviso represents an infringement of
an employer's first amendment rights does not, of course, dispose of
the constitutional issue since even protected activity can be regulated
in pursuit of a compelling state interest. In UA W, the plaintiffs as-
serted two such interests, arguing that the proviso was necessary to
preclude employers from interfering with relations between unions
and their members and to prevent employer abuse of the union
member's right to sue his labor organization.2 The first interest is
apparently based on the broader governmental goal of protecting
unionism and the efficacy of the collective bargaining process,53 while
the second suggests that the proviso is necessary to protect unions
from bad faith suits brought by the employer in the employee's
name.' The UA W court rejected both of these arguments, concluding
without discussion that "neither of the governmental interests
in the regulation of labor-management relations is 'sufficiently com-
pelling' to justify the direct and absolute infringement of the first
amendment rights of the Foundation and its contributors that is
imposed by the proviso."55
Since the governmental interest in "[the facilitation of] the
organization of unions and the establishment of collective bargaining
relationships"56 has long been recognized as the basis of federal labor
legislation, the unions' claim that the proviso is necessary to prevent
employer interference in intraunion affairs is superficially appealing.
Although employer speech concerning a labor dispute is constitution-
ally protected, a number of Supreme Court cases have held that the
right is a qualified one. In Gissel, for example, the Court held that
section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act,6 which prohibits
employers from using coercive speech to deter unionization, is not an
unconstitutional infringement of the employer's first amendment
52. 433 F. Supp. at 483.
53. Brief for Appellants at 45-47, UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense
& Educ. Foundation, Nos. 77-1739, 77-1766, 77-1767 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 16 & 23,
1977).
54. Id. at 47-48.
55. 433 F. Supp. at 483.
56. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. Rzv. 389, 389 (1950).
57. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-20 (1969); NLRB
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
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rights. 9 While affirming the general principle that an employer's
right to free speech cannot be infringed by a union, the Court empha-
sized the importance of this principle in the labor context: "Any
assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course,
must be made in the context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an
employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees
to associate freely . . .-.
In view of the control exercised by an employer over an em-
ployee's livelihood, the potential threat to unionism and the collec-
tive bargaining process represented by an employer's use of coercive
methods to influence employee decisions about union membership is
clear. Employer funding of union member lawsuits against labor or-
ganizations, however, is not such a coercive method. Since the em-
ployees in question voluntarily participate in a lawsuit against their
union because they feel that they have been treated unfairly and not
because they have been coerced, the employer funding raises no risk
that other employees will be restrained from organizing by the retali-
atory threats of employers. Thus, rather than depriving an employee
of the free choice to organize or associate, an employer's interference
in intraunion affairs through funding a member's lawsuit appears to
be a method of vindicating the union member's rights.
Moreover, by enacting section 101(a)(4) of the Landrum-Griffin
Act, Congress indicated that the protection of the union member's
basic rights through the courts outweighed the inconvenience and
expense that labor organizations would incur when sued by their
members. There would appear to be no governmental interest in pre-
venting employers from funding at least good faith suits since such
suits promote the basic goal, embodied in title I of the Landrum-
Griffin Act, of protecting the rights of union members against the
unions."
59. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-20 (1969). See generally
Browne & Sachs, The Suppression of Employer Free Speech-A New Ban on "Con-
scious Overstatements" and a Caveat Against "Brinkmanship," 15 VL. L. REv. 588,
588-91 (1970); Comment, Labor Law-Constitutional Law: Supreme Court Limits
Employer Speech on Unionization, 5 VAL. U.L. Ray. 178, 179 (1970).
60. 395 U.S. at 617.
61. See note 11 supra. Union members apparently have not exercised their right
to sue in great numbers. In the first eighteen months after the Landrum-Griffim Act
was enacted, only about thirty cases arising under it led to reported opinions in the
federal district courts. See Rothman, Judicial Interpretation of the "Bill of Rights" for
Union Members, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 995, 995-96 (1961). Part of the reason for the small
volume of litigation appears to be that union members usually lack the financial
resources necessary to bring suit against their labor organizations. See id. at 996. See
generally Note, Facilitating the Union Member's Right to Sue Under Sections 412 and
501(b) of Landrum-Griffin, 58 GEO. L.J. 221 (1969); Note, The Furtherance of Union
Democracy: Providing for Counsel Fees in Labor Union Members' Bill of Rights Suits,
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The unions' second argument, that the proviso is necessary to
prevent employer abuse of the union member's right to sue, is much
stronger. The legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin Act indicates
that Congress' purpose was to prevent sham suits, where the union
member has no colorable grievance but is instead merely fronting for
the employer.2 The elimination of the proviso thus raises the spectre
of widespread groundless lawsuits instigated by employers merely to
harass the unions.
It is by no means clear, however, that in the absence of the
proviso this spectre would become a reality. First, there are certain
practical constraints on the financing of such lawsuits, including the
cost of the litigation, the questionable utility of the litigation in gain-
ing a bargaining advantage, and the prospect that such suits may so
antagonize the union as to be counterproductive. Second, the require-
ment that a union member exhaust union hearing procedures before
he files suitI also provides protection against sham suits. If the union
member's action is indeed specious and is intended merely to harass
the union, the intraunion remedy procedure would presumably ex-
pose that fact. Of course, the union member, perhaps acting at the
direction of the employer, could still file suit, claiming that the union
hearing process afforded him no relief. But in most cases a union
could presumably establish that the employee had pressed his claim
in bad faith and had failed to cooperate with union officials in resolv-
ing it." Where such is the case, the union could have the suit summa-
rily dismissed, either by motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
or by motion for summary judgment. 5
31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 643 (1970). Allowing employers to fund union member suits would
help alleviate this problem.
62. See Aaron, supra note 15, at 871; text accompanying note 14 supra.
63. The text of the exhaustion of intraunion remedies proviso of section 101(a)(4)
appears at note 12 supra.
64. This assumes, of course, that the union constitution provides for a
"reasonable" hearing procedure within the organization itself. If it does not, a signifi-
cant number of cases have held that the union member may resort directly to the
courts. See generally Rothman, supra note 61, at 1010-14.
65. A large percentage of actions arising under title I of the Landrum-Griffin Act
have been dismissed by the federal district courts. In the first eighteen months after
the statute was enacted, over two-thirds of these cases were dismissed, usually on the
ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action or that the plaintiff had failed
to exhaust available intraunion remedies. See id. at 996.
A further protection for the union against vexatious suits is at least theoretically
available in the tort actions of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. These
actions seem particularly well-adapted to giving the union recourse in situations where
employers have instigated groundless union member suits. To establish a cause of
action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's suit was
brought against him with a lack of belief in the possible success of the action. The
plaintiff must also show that the former action was brought without probable cause
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Nevertheless, it is clear that some baseless suits, which might
not have been brought but for the assistance of an employer, may still
proceed through discovery and reach a trial on the merits. In such
situations, costs and attorneys' fees could deplete a union's resources
and, in the case of some small local unions, could conceivably impair
the union's collective bargaining position. Moreover, regardless of the
actual cost of such suits, there would appear to be a governmental
interest in assuring that union funds are not wasted in defending
sham suits. This concern is mitigated, however, by the fact that
federal courts have the discretionary power to award attorneys' fees
in cases where the losing party has acted in bad faith. Noting the
general rule that attorneys' fees are not recoverable by the prevailing
party in absence of an express statutory authorization, the Supreme
Court has recently recognized an exception where the losing party has
"acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea- -
sons."66 This exception would clearly seem to apply in those few cases
where an action has been brought merely to harass the union and
deplete its resources.
Apart from the potential cost of the litigation, it might be feared
that a large volume of baseless suits would cause intraunion dissi-
dence, undermine union discipline, and indirectly hamper the effec-
tiveness of the union in the collective bargaining process. It is, of
course, a widely accepted view that union discipline "is essential if a,
union is to be an effective collective bargaining agent, '6 7 and it'
could be argued that union discipline will suffer if those members
who are fined or expelled for misconduct continually appeal those
decisions to the courts. If the union prevailed in these actions,
however, it is difficult to see how union discipline would be under-
mined. Other union members would hardly be encouraged to engage
and, ordinarily, that it was terminated in his favor. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ToRTs § 120 (4th ed. 1971).
Abuse of process affords the union a slightly different basis for relief, the basic
requirement being a showing that the legal process is being used for an end other than
that of the proceeding itself. See id. § 121. The tort of abuse of process may have an
advantage over malicious prosecution since the action may be brought before the
allegedly abusive proceeding has been terminated in the plaintiff's favor. See id.
While the union would theoretically be able to make these showings in many
instances where "sham" suits have been instituted against it, it should be noted that
these tort actions have certain shortcomings. Both actions could only be brought
against the union member and not the employer; actual damages would have to be
proven; and these torts are not recognized in all jurisdictions. See id. §§ 120-121.
66. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974) (citing Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962)); see Alyeska Pipeline Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).




in similar misconduct of their own, and it is not likely that they' would
lose faith in the union and seek an alternative collective bargaining
agent.
Given the preceding analysis, the governmental interests in pro-
tecting unions from lawsuits by their members funded by employers
hardly appear compelling. Nevertheless, an argument can be made
that the funding of sham suits could be proscribed without an uncon-
stitutional infringement of an employer's first amendment rights. A
bar on employer funding of such lawsuits would not technically rest
on a compelling state interest argument, but instead on the view that
bad faith suits brought merely to harass the other party are not
protected by the first amendment. Several Supreme Court cases have
adopted this approach. In California Motor Transport Co. v. Truck-
ing Unlimited,8 for example, the Court held that right of access to
the courts is not constitutionally protected where "a pattern of base-
less, repetitive claims . . . emerge[s] which leads the factfimder to
conclude that the . . . judicial processes have been abused."6' Dic-
tum in Button also supports the view that a lawsuit financed by an
employer may be constitutionally barred where the motive is to har-
ass the union and interfere with its effectiveness as a collective bar-
gaining agent: "Resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitu-
tional rights is a different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or
avaricious use of the legal process for purely private gain."7
In view of its broad language that "no interested employer or
employer association" may fund a union member lawsuit, the em-
ployer proviso of section 101(a)(4) clearly encompasses more than
sham suits and thus cannot pass constitutional scrutiny in its pres-
ent form. It is conceivable, however, that Congress might attempt to
redraft the proviso in narrower terms so that it applies only to those
suits that are not constitutionally protected. Even if the proviso could
be so revised, however, a trial on the merits may still be required
before a court could determine that the suit was baseless and brought
in bad faith. The best solution would be a statute requiring federal
courts to award attorneys' fees and court costs to the defendant union
when the court finds that the employer has funded an action in bad
faith." This would provide a strong deterrent to sham suits and elimi-
68. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
69. Id. at 513.
70. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963).
71. Congress has explicitly provided for the allowance of attorneys' fees in a
number of statutes protecting various federal rights. Under federal antitrust laws, for
example, the allowance of attorneys' fees to a plaintiff awarded treble damages is
mandatory. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Under patent legislation, the court is allowed
to award reasonable attorneys' fees in exceptional cases. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970).
Under title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the prevailing party is entitled to attor-.
neys' fees at the discretion of the court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a:3(b) (1970).
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nate the financial harm to the unions if the suits are brought.
Although the UA W court's conclusion that the National Right to
Work Foundation's first amendment rights were unduly infringed by
the employer proviso is consistent with a more thorough analysis of
the complex issues presented by the case, the case might better have
been decided on the broader ground that the proviso represents a
potential infringement on the rights of all employers, and not just
those who are members of an association with broad political objec-
tives. UAW is certainly not a case where the free speech right is
asserted in its most appealing form. The right to fund another per-
son's lawsuit, particularly when the purpose is to further one's own
economic interest, seems quite far removed from the pure advocacy
of ideas and beliefs traditionally associated with the first amend-
ment. Nevertheless, when viewed in the context of developing first
amendment law, particularly that dealing with commercial speech,
the outcome in UA W is well within the confines of modem first
amendment jurisprudence.
